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ABSTRACT
Recent works in social network stream analysis show that a user’s online persona attributes (e.g.,
gender, ethnicity, political interest, location, etc.) can be accurately inferred from the topics the
user writes about or engages with. Attribute and preference inferences have been widely used to
serve personalized recommendations, directed ads, and to enhance the user experience in social
networks. However, revealing a user’s sensitive attributes could represent a privacy threat to some
individuals. Microtargeting (e.g., Cambridge Analytica scandal), surveillance, and discriminating
ads are examples of threats to user privacy caused by sensitive attribute inference. In this paper,
we propose Multifaceted privacy, a novel privacy model that aims to obfuscate a user’s sensitive
attributes while publicly preserving the user’s public persona. To achieve multifaceted privacy, we
build Aegis, a prototype client-centric social network stream processing system that helps preserve
multifaceted privacy, and thus allowing social network users to freely express their online personas
without revealing their sensitive attributes of choice. Aegis allows social network users to control
which persona attributes should be publicly revealed and which ones should be kept private. For
this, Aegis continuously suggests topics and hashtags to social network users to post in order to
obfuscate their sensitive attributes and hence confuse content-based sensitive attribute inferences.
The suggested topics are carefully chosen to preserve the user’s publicly revealed persona attributes
while hiding their private sensitive persona attributes. Our experiments show that adding as few as 0
to 4 obfuscation posts (depending on how revealing the original post is) successfully hides the user
specified sensitive attributes without changing the user’s public persona attributes
Keywords Attribute Privacy, Online-Persona, Content-Based Inference
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, social network platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram have attracted hundreds of
millions of users [11–13]. These platforms are widely and pervasively used to communicate, create online communi-
ties [26], and socialize. Social media users develop, over time, online persona [45] that reflect their overall interests,
activism, and diverse orientations. Users have numerous followers that are specifically interested in their personas and
their postings which are aligned with these personas. However, due to the rise of machine learning and deep learning
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techniques, user posts and social network interactions can be used to accurately and automatically infer many user
persona attributes such as gender, ethnicity, age, political interest, and location [33, 38, 46, 47]. Recent work shows that
it is possible to predict an individual user’s location solely using content-based analysis of the user’s posts [19, 20].
Zhang et al. [46] show that hashtags in user posts can alone be used to precisely infer a user’s location with accuracy of
70% to 76%. Also, Facebook likes analysis was successfully used to distinguish between Democrats and Republicans
with 85% accuracy [33].
Social network giants have widely used attribute inference to serve personalized trending topics, to suggest pages to like
and accounts to follow, and to notify users about hyper-local events. In addition, social networks such as Facebook use
tracking [9] and inference techniques to classify users into categories (e.g. Expats, Away from hometown, Politically
Liberal, etc.). These categories are used by advertisers and small businesses to enhance directed advertising campaigns.
However, recent news about the Cambridge Analytica scandal [6] and similar data breaches [14] suggest that users
cannot depend on the social network providers to preserve their privacy. User sensitive attributes such as gender,
ethnicity, and location have been widely misused in illegally discriminating ads, microtargeting, and surveillance. A
recent ACLU report [5] shows that Facebook illegally allowed employers to exclude women from receiving their job
ads on Facebook. Also, several reports have shown that Facebook allows discrimination against some ethnic groups in
housing ads [10]. News about the Russian-linked Facebook Ads during the 2016 election suggests that the campaign
targeted voters in swing states [2] and specifically in Michigan and Wisconsin [3]. In addition, location data collected
from Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram has been used to target activists of color [1].
An online-persona can be thought of as the set of user attributes that can be inferred about a user from their online
postings and interactions. These attributes fall into two categories: public and private persona attributes. Users should
decide which attributes fall in each category. Some attributes (e.g., political orientation and ethnicity) should be publicly
revealed as a user’s followers might follow her because of her public persona attributes. Other attributes (e.g., gender
and location) are private and sensitive, and the user would not like them to be revealed. However, with the above
mentioned inference methods, the social media providers, as well as any adversary receiving the user posting can reveal
a user’s sensitive attributes.
To remedy this situation, in this paper, we propose multifaceted privacy, a novel privacy model that aims to obfuscate
a user’s sensitive attributes while revealing the user’s public persona attributes. Multifaceted privacy allows users to
freely express their online public personas without revealing any sensitive attributes of their choice. For example, a
#BlackLivesMatter activist might want to hide her location from the police and from discriminating advertisers while
continuing to post about topics specifically related to her political movement. This activist can try to hide her location
by disabling the geo-tagging feature of her posts and hiding her IP address using an IP obfuscation browser like Tor [4].
However, recent works have shown that content-based location inferences can successfully and accurately predict a
user’s location solely based on the content of her posts [19, 20, 46]. If this activist frequently posts about topics that
discuss BLM events in Montpelier, Vermont, she is most probably a resident of Montpelier (Montpelier has a low
African American population).
To achieve multifaceted privacy, we build Aegis1, a prototype client-centric social network stream processing system that
enables social network users to take charge of protecting their own privacy, instead of depending on the social network
providers. Our philosophy in building Aegis is that social network users need to introduce some noisy interactions
and obfuscation posts to confuse content based attribute inferences. This idea is inspired from Rivest’s chaffing
and winnowing privacy model in [39]. Unlike in [39] where the sender and receiver exchange a secret that allows
the receiver to easily distinguish the chaff from the wheat, in social networks, a user (sender) posts to an open world
of followers (receivers) and it is not feasible to exchange a secret with every recipient. In addition, a subset of the
recipients could be adversaries who try to infer the user’s sensitive attributes from their postings. Choosing this noise
introduces a challenging dichotomy and tension between the utility of the user persona and her privacy. Similar notions
of dichotomy between sensitive and non sensitive personal attributes have been explored in sociology and are referred
to as contextual integrity [37]. Obfuscation posts need to be carefully chosen to achieve obfuscation of private attributes
without damaging the user’s public persona. For example, a #NoBanNoWall activist loses persona utility if she writes
about #BuildTheWall to hide her location. Multifaceted privacy represents a continuum between privacy and persona
utility. Figure 1 captures this continuum, where the x-axis represents the persona attributes that need to be obfuscated or
kept private while the y-axis represents the persona attributes that should be publicly preserved or revealed. Figure 1
shows that privacy is the reciprocal of the persona utility. Any attribute that needs to be kept private cannot be preserved
in the public persona. As illustrated, the more attributes are kept private, the more obfuscation overhead is needed to
achieve their privacy. A user who chooses to publicly reveal all her persona attributes achieves no attribute privacy and
hence requires no obfuscation posting overhead.
1Aegis: a shield in the Greek mythology.
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Figure 1: The dichotomy of multifaceted privacy: persona vs. privacy.
As illustrated in Figure 1, a user chooses a point on the diagonal line of the multifaceted privacy that determines which
persona attributes should be publicly revealed (e.g., political interest, ethnicity, etc) and which ones should be kept
private (e.g., location, gender, etc). Note that users can reorder the attributes on the axes of Figure 1 in order to achieve
their intended public/private attribute separation. Unlike previous approaches that require users to change their posts
and hashtags [46] to hide their sensitive attributes, Aegis allows users to publish their original posts without changing
their content. Our experiments show that adding obfuscation posts successfully preserves multifaceted privacy. Aegis
considers the added noise as the cost to pay for achieving multifaceted privacy. Therefore, Aegis targets users who are
willing to write additional posts to hide their sensitive attributes.
Aegis is user-centric, as we believe that users need to take control of their own privacy concerns and cannot depend on
the social media providers. This is challenging as it requires direct user engagement and certain sacrifices. However,
we believe Aegis will help better understand the complexity of privacy as well as the role for individual engagement
and responsibility. Aegis represents a first step in the long path to better understand the tensions between user privacy,
the utility of social media, and trust in public social media providers. This is an overdue discussion that needs to be
discussed by the scientific community, and we believe Aegis will facilitate the medium for this discussion.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose multifaceted privacy, a novel privacy model that represents a continuum between the privacy of
sensitive private attributes and public persona attributes.
• We build Aegis, a prototype user-centric social network stream processing system that preserves multifaceted
privacy. Aegis continuously analyzes social media streams to suggest topics to post that are aligned with the
user’s public persona but hide their sensitive attributes.
• We conduct an extensive experimental study to show that Aegis can successfully achieve multifaceted privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We explain the models of user, topic, and security in Section 2. Topic
classification algorithms and data structures that achieve multifaceted privacy are described in Section 3 and Aegis’s
system design is explained in Section 4. Afterwards, an experimental evaluation is conducted in Section 5 to evaluate
the effectiveness of Aegis in achieving the multifaceted privacy. The related work is presented in Section 6 and future
extensions are presented in Section 7. The paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Models
In this section, we present the user, topic, and security models. The user and topic models explain how users and topics
are represented in the system. The security model presents both the privacy and the adversary models.
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2.1 User Model
Our user model is similar to the user model presented in [27]. The set U is the set of social network users where
U = {u1, u2, ...}. A user ui is represented by a vector of attributes Vui (e.g., gender Vui [g], ethnicity Vui [e], age Vui [a],
political interest Vui [p], location Vui [l], etc). Each attribute a has a domain a.d and the attribute values are picked
from this domain. For example, the gender attribute g has domain g.d = {male, female}2 and ∀ui∈UVui [g] ∈ g.d. An
example user ux is represented by the vector Vux where Vux = (g: female, e: African American, a: 23, p: Democrat, l:
New York). Attribute domains can form a hierarchy (e.g., location: city→ county→ state→ country) and an attribute
can be generalized by climbing up this hierarchy. A user who lives in Los Angeles is also a resident of Orange County,
California, and the United States. Other attributes can form trivial hierarchies (e.g., gender: male or female→ * (no
knowledge)).
The user attribute vector Vui is divided into two main categories: 1) the set of public persona attributes V
p
ui and 2) the
set of private sensitive attributes V sui . Multifaceted privacy aims to publicly reveal all persona attributes in V
p
ui while
hiding all sensitive attributes in V sui . Each user defines her V
s
ui and V
p
ui a priori. As shown in Figure 1, attributes in V
p
ui
are the complement of the attributes in V sui . Therefore, each attribute either belongs to V
p
ui or V
s
ui .
2.2 Topic Model
The set T represents the set of all topics that are discussed by all the social network users in U . T τi ⊂ T represents the
set of all the topics posted by user ui’s till time τ where T τi = {t1i , t2i , ..., tni }. Social network topics are characterized
by the attributes of the users who post about these topics. Unlike user attributes, which are discrete values, topic
attributes are represented as distributions. For example, an analysis of the ethnicity of the users who post about the
topic #BlackLivesMatter can result in the distribution 10% Asian, 25% White, 15% Hispanic, and 50% Black. This
distribution means that Asians, Whites, Hispanics, and Blacks post about the topic #BlackLivesMatter and 50% of the
users who post about this topic are Black. A topic ti is represented by a vector of attribute distributions Vti where Vti [g],
Vti [e], Vti [p], and Vti [l] are respectively the gender, the ethnicity, the political party, and the location distributions of
the users who post about ti.
To extract the gender, ethnicity, and political interest attribute distributions of different topics, we use the language
models introduced in [26, 41]. However, any other available model could be used to infer user attributes. The location
distribution of a topic is inferred using the geo-tagged public posts about this topic, where the location of the publisher
is explicitly attached to the post.
2.3 Security Model
An approach that is commonly used for attribute obfuscation is generalization. The idea behind attribute generalization
is to report a generalized value of a user’s sensitive attribute in order to hide the actual attribute value within. Consider
location as a sensitive attribute example. Many works [36, 46] have used location generalization in different contexts.
Mokbel et al. [36] use location generalization to hide a user’s exact location from Location Based Services (LBS). A
query that asks "what is the nearest gas station to my exact location in Stanford, CA?" should be altered to "list all gas
stations in California". Notice that the returned result of the altered query has to be filtered at the client side to find the
answer of the original query. Similarly, Andres et al. [17] propose geo-indistinguishability, a location privacy model
that uses differential privacy to hide a user’s exact location in a circle of radius r from LBS providers. The wider the
generalization range, the more privacy achieved, and the more network and processing overhead are added at the client
side. Similarly, in the context of social networks, Zhang et al. [46] require Twitter users to generalize their location
revealing hashtags in order to hide their exact location. For example, a user whose post includes "#WillisTower" should
be generalized to "#Chicago" to hide a user’s exact location. Notice that generalization requires users to alter their
original posts or queries.
To overcome these limitations and to allow users to write their posts using their own words, we adopt the notion of
k-attribute-indistinguishability privacy that is defined as follows. For every sensitive attribute s ∈ V sui , the user defines
an indistinguishability parameter ks. ks determines the number of attribute values among which the real value of
parameter s is hidden. For example, a user who lives in CA sets kl = 3 in order to hide her original state location, CA,
among 3 different states (e.g., CA, IL, and NY). This means that a content-based inference attack should not be able to
distinguish the user’s real location among the set {CA, IL, NY}. As explained in 2.1, attribute domains either form
multi-level hierarchies (e.g., location) or trivial hierarchies (e.g., gender and ethnicity). Unlike in attribute generalization
where a user’s attribute value is generalized by climbing up the attribute hierarchy, k-attribute-indistinguishability
2Due to the limitation of the inference models, the gender attribute is considered only binary. However, better models can be used
to infer non binary gender attribute values.
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achieves the privacy of an attribute value by hiding it among k− 1 attribute values chosen from the siblings of the actual
attribute value in the same hierarchy level (e.g., a user’s state level location is hidden among k − 1 other states instead
of generalizing it to the entire country). The following inference attack explains when k-attribute-indistinguishability is
achieved or violated.
The adversary assumptions: the adversary model and the inference attacks are similar to the ones presented in [46].
However, unlike in [46], our inference attack is not only limit to the location attribute but also can be extended to infer
every user sensitive attribute in V sui . The adversary has access to the set of all topics T and all the public posts related
to each topic. This assumption covers any adversary who can crawl or get access to the public posts of every topic
in the social network. As proposed in Section 1, the target user ui does not reveal her sensitive attribute values to the
public (e.g., a user who wants to hide her location must obfuscates her IP address and disable the geo-tagging feature
for her posts). Therefore, the adversary can only see the content of the public posts published by ui. The adversary uses
their knowledge about the set of all topics T and the set of topics T τi discussed by ui to infer her sensitive attributes.
Multifaceted privacy protects users against an adversary who only performs content-based inference attacks. Therefore,
multifaceted privacy assumes that the adversary does not have any side channel knowledge that can be used to reveal a
user’s sensitive attribute value (e.g., another online profile that is directly linked to the user ui where sensitive attributes
such as gender, ethnicity, or location are revealed).
Inference attack: the adversary’s ultimate goal is to reveal or at least have high confidence in the knowledge of the
sensitive attribute values of the target user ui. For this, the adversary runs a content-based attack as follows. First, the
adversary crawls the set of topics T τi that user ui wrote about. For each topic, the adversary infers the demographics of
the users who wrote about this topic. Then, the adversary aggregates the demographics of all the topics in T τi . The
adversary uses the aggregated demographics to estimate the sensitive attributes of user ui. The details of the inference
attack is explained as follows.
For each topic tj ∈ T τi , an adversary crawls the set of posts Ptj that discusses topic tj and for each post pi ∈ Ptj , the
adversary uses some models to infer the gender, ethnicity, political interest, and location of the user who wrote this
post. Then, the adversary uses the inferred attributes of each post in topic tj to populate tj’s distribution vector Vtj .
For example, Vtj [g] is the gender distribution of all users who wrote about topic tj . Similarly, Vtj [e], Vtj [p], and Vtj [l]
are the ethnicity, political interest, and location distributions of the users who posted about topic tj . We define V ∗ui as
a vector of attribute distributions that is used to estimate the attributes of user ui. V ∗ui is the result of aggregating the
normalized Vtj for every topic tj ∈ T τi as shown in Equation 1.
V ∗ui =
∑
tj∈T τi
Vtj
|Ptj |
|T τi |
(1)
Equation 1 shows that the topic’s attribute distribution vector Vtj is first normalized by dividing Vtj by the number of
posts in topic tj . This normalization equalizes the effect of every topic tj ∈ T τi on the user’s attribute estimations in
V ∗ui . V
∗
ui is the summation of the normalized Vtj for every topic tj ∈ T τi divided by the number of topics in T τi . V ∗ui [a]
is the distribution of attribute a for user ui. For example, a user might have a gender distribution V ∗ui [g] = {female:0.8,
male:0.2}. This means that the inference attack using ui’s posted topics suggests that the probability ui is a female is
80% while ui is a male is only 20%. For every attribute a, an attacker uses the maximum attribute value max(V ∗ui [a])
as an estimation of the actual value Vui [a]. In the previous example, an attacker would infer V
∗
ui [g] = female as an
estimate of the gender of user ui. An inference attack succeeds in estimating an attribute a if the attacker can have
sufficient confidence in estimating the actual value Vui [a]. This confidence is achieved if the difference between the
maximum estimated attribute value of a and the top-kth estimated attribute value of a is greater than ∆a. For example,
if ∆g = 0.1 and kg = 2 (assuming gender is a binary attribute and it needs to be hidden among the 2 gender attribute
values), then an attacker successfully estimates ui’s gender if the max(V ∗ui [g]) is distinguishable from the 2
nd highest
value in V ∗ui [g] by more than 10%. In the previous example where V
∗
ui [g] = {female:0.8, male:0.2}, an attacker succeeds
to estimate ui’s gender = female as the difference between V ∗ui [g].female− V ∗ui [g].male ≥ ∆g .
Figure 2 show an example of a successful inference attack and another of a failed inference attack on attribute a of user
ui. As shown in Figure 2.a, the maximum estimated attribute value V ∗ui [a]1 is distinguishable from the top-k
th (ka for
attribute a) attribute values in V ∗ui [a] by more than ∆a. In this scenario, an attacker can conclude with high confidence
that V ∗ui [a]1 is a good estimate for Vui [a]. However, in Figure 2.b, V
∗
ui [a]1 is indistinguishable from the top-k
th attribute
values in V ∗ui [a]. In this scenario, the attack is marked failed and k-attribute-indistinguishability is achieved.
The parameter k is used to determine the number of attribute values within which the user’s actual attribute value is
hidden. The bigger the k, the less the attacker’s confidence about the user’s actual attribute value. As a result, increasing
k introduces uncertainty in the attacker’s inference and hence boosts the adversary cost to micro-target users who hide
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Figure 2: Illustrating k-attribute-indistinguishability
their actual attribute values among k different attribute values. For example, an adversary who wants to target a user
in location CA has to pay 3 times the advertisement cost to reach the same user if the user equally hides her location
among 3 other locations (e.g., CA, IL, and NY).
We understand that the requirement to determine the sensitive attributes and an indistinguishability parameter value ks
for every sensitive attribute s ∈ V sui could be challenging for many users. Users might not have a sense of the number
of attribute values to obfuscate the actual value of a particular attribute. One possible solution to address this usability
challenge is to design a questionnaire for Aegis’s first time users. This questionnaire helps Aegis understand which
persona attributes are sensitive and how critical the privacy of every sensitive attribute is to every user. This allows
Aegis to auto-configure ks of every sensitive attribute s for every user. The details of such an approach is out of the
scope of this paper. In this paper, we assume that Aegis is preconfigured with the set V sui and for every attribute s ∈ V sui ,
the value of ks is determined.
3 Multifaceted Privacy
Multifaceted privacy aims to obfuscate a user’s sensitive attributes for every attribute in V sui . This has to be done
while publicly revealing every attribute in the user’s public persona in V pui . Various approaches have been used to
obfuscate specific sensitive attributes, in particular, Tagvisor [46] protects users against content-based inference attacks
by requiring users to alter their posts by changing or replacing hashtags that reveal their sensitive attributes, in their
case location. Our approach is different, as it is paramount to not only preserving the privacy of the sensitive attributes,
but also to preserve the on-line persona of the user, and hence reveal their public attributes. It is critical for a user to
post their posting in their own words that reflect their persona. We therefore preserve multifaceted privacy by hiding a
specific post among other obfuscation posts. Our approach needs to suggest posts that are aligned with the user’s public
persona but linked to alternative attribute values of their sensitive attributes in order to obfuscate them. This requires
a topic classification model that simplifies the process of suggesting obfuscation posts. For example, consider State
level location as a sensitive attribute. To achieve k-location indistinguishability, a user’s exact State should be hidden
among k − 1 other States. This requires suggesting obfuscation postings about topics that are linked to these other
k − 1 States. Users in NY state can use topics that are mainly discussed in IL to obfuscate their location among NY
and IL. To discover such potential topics, all topics that are discussed on a social network need to be classified by the
sensitive attributes that need to be obfuscated, State level location in this example. A topic is linked to some State if the
maximum estimated State location of this topic, max(Vti [l]), is distinguishable from other State location estimates in
Vti [l] by more than ∆l. For example, if ∆l = 10%, a topic that has a State location distribution of {NY=0.6, IL=0.2,
CA=0.1, Others=0.1} is linked to NY State while a topic that does not have a distinguishable State location inference
by more than ∆l is not linked to any State. In this section, we first explain a simple but incorrect topic classification
model that successfully suggests obfuscation posts that hide a user’s sensitive attributes but does not preserve her public
persona. Then, we explain how to modify the topic classification model to suggest obfuscation posts that do achieve
multifaceted privacy.
A simple incorrect proposal: in this proposal, topics are classified independently by every sensitive attribute. As
shown in Figure 3, each attribute forms an independent hierarchy. The root of the hierarchy has the topics that are not
linked to a specific attribute value. Topics that are strongly linked to some attribute value fall down in the hierarchy
node that represents this attribute value. For example, State level location attribute forms a hierarchy of two levels. The
first level, the root, has all the topics that do not belong to a specific State. A topic like #Trump is widely discussed in all
the States and therefore it resides on the root of the location attribute. However, #cowboy is mainly discussed in TX and
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Figure 3: Each attribute independently forms a hierarchy
therefore it falls down in the hierarchy to the TX node. To obfuscate a user’s State location, topics need to be selected
from the sibling nodes of the user’s State in the State level location hierarchy. These topics belong to other locations and
can be used to achieve k-location-indistinguishability privacy. Although this proposal successfully achieves location
privacy, the suggested posts are not necessarily aligned with the user’s public online persona. For example, this
obfuscation technique could suggest the topic #BuildTheWall (from TX) to an activist (from NY) who frequently posts
about #NoBanNoWall in order to hide her location. This misalignment between the suggested obfuscation posts and the
user’s public persona discourages users from seeking privacy fearing the damage to their public online persona.
Figure 4: A dependent topic tree where public attributes are at the top while private attributes are at the bottom
A persona preserving proposal: To overcome the independent classification shortcomings, obfuscation postings need
to be suggested from a tree hierarchy that captures relevant dependencies among all user attributes including both public
persona and private sensitive attributes. Public attributes need to reside on the upper levels of the classification tree while
private ones reside on the bottom levels of the tree as shown in Figure 4. To achieve k-attribute-indistinguishability,
sibling values of the sensitive attributes are used to hide the actual value of these sensitive attributes. By placing
the public attributes higher up on the tree, we ensure that the suggest topics adhere to the public persona. Finally,
multifaceted privacy only requires all the public attributes, regardless of their order, to reside on the upper levels of the
tree while all the private attributes, regardless of their order, to reside on the lower levels of the tree.
Social network topics are dependently classified in the tree by the attribute domain values at each level. For example,
if the top most level of the tree is the political party attribute, topics that are mainly discussed by Democrats are placed
in the left green child while topics that are mainly discussed by Republicans are place in the right green child. Note
that topics that have no inference reside in the root of the hierarchy. Now, if the second public persona attribute is
ethnicity (shown as blue nodes in Figure 4), topics in both the Democratic and Republican nodes are classified by the
ethnicity domain attribute values. For example, topics that are mainly discussed by White Democrats are placed under
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the Democratic node in the White ethnicity node while topics that are mainly discussed by Asian Republicans are
put under the Republican node in the Asian ethnicity node. This classification is applied at every tree level for every
attribute. Now, assume a user is White, Female, Democrat, who lives in CA and wants to hide her location (shown as
red nodes in Figure 4) while publicly revealing her ethnicity, gender, and political party. In this case, topics that reside in
the sibling nodes of the leaf of her persona path, e.g., topics that are mainly discussed by White Female Democrats who
live in locations other than CA (e.g., NY and IL) can be suggested as obfuscation topics. This dependent classification
guarantees that the suggested topics are aligned with the user’s public persona but belong to other sensitive attribute
values (different locations in this example). Note that this technique is general enough to obfuscate any attribute and
any number of attributes. Each user defines her sensitive attribute(s) and the classification tree would be constructed
with these attributes to the bottom thus guaranteeing that the suggested posts do not violate multifaceted privacy.
4 Aegis System Design
This section presents Aegis, a prototype social network stream processing system that implements multifaceted privacy
and overcomes the adversarial content-based attribute inference attacks discussed in Section 2.3. Aegis achieves
k-attribute-indistinguishability by suggesting topics to post that are aligned with the social network user’s public persona
while hiding the user’s sensitive attributes among their other domain values. To achieve this, Aegis uses the classification
and suggestion models discussed in Section 3. Aegis is designed in a user-centric manner which is configured on the
user’s local machine. In fact, Aegis can be developed as a browser extension where all the user interactions with the
social network are handled through this extension. Every local deployment of Aegis only needs to construct a partition
of the attribute-based topic classification hierarchy developed in Figure 4. This partition (or sub-hierarchy) include the
user’s attribute path from the root to a leaf in addition to the sibling nodes of the user’s sensitive attribute nodes. For
example, a user whose attributes are Female, White, Democrat, and CA and wants to obfuscate her State location only
requires Aegis to construct the Female, White, Democrat, CA path in addition to k − 1 other paths with the shared
prefix Female, White, Democrat but linked to k− 1 other States. These k− 1 States are used to hide the user’s true state
in order to achieve k-location-indistinguishability. Note that if another user’s public persona is specifically associated
with their location while they consider their ethnicity to be sensitive, then the hierarchy needs to be reordered to reflect
this criteria.
Although Aegis can be integrated with different online social network platforms, our prototype implementation of Aegis
only supports Twitter to illustrate Aegis’s functionality. Twitter provides developers with several public APIs [8] that
allow them to stream tweets that discuss certain topics. In addition, Twitter streaming APIs allow developers to sample
1% of all the tweets posted on Twitter. In Twitter, a topic is represented by either a hashtag or a keyword. Aegis is built
to work for new Twitter profiles in order to continuously confuse an adversary about a profile’s true sensitive attribute
values from the genesis of this profile. Aegis is not designed to work with existing old profiles as an adversary could
have already used their existing posts to reveal their sensitive attribute values. Even though Aegis suggests obfuscation
posts, an adversary can distinguish the old original posts from the newly added original posts accompanied by their
obfuscation posts and hence reveals the user’s sensitive attributes true values.
Aegis is designed to achieve the following goals:
1. to automate the process of streaming and classifying Twitter topics according to their attributes,
2. to construct and continuously maintain the topic classification sub-hierarchy,
3. and finally to use the topic classification sub-hierarchy to suggest topics to the user that achieve multifaceted
privacy.
To achieve these goals, Aegis consists of two main processes:
• a Twitter analyzer Process TP and
• a topic Suggestion Process SP .
TP continuously analyzes the topics that are being discussed on Twitter and for each topic ti, TP uses the topic
attribute inference models to infer ti’s attribute distribution vector Vti . The accuracy of the topic attribute inference
increases as the number of posts that discuss topic tj , |Ptj |, increases. TP uses a local key-value store as a topic
repository where the key is the topic id tj ∈ T and the value is the topic attribute distribution vector Vti . In addition,
TP constructs and continuously maintains the topic classification sub-hierarchy that classifies the topics based on
their attributes. This topic classification sub-hierarchy is used for suggesting obfuscation topics. For this, the user
provides TP with both their attribute vector values Vui and their sensitive attribute vector V
s
ui . Vui and V
s
ui determine
the sub-hierarchy that TP needs to maintain in order to obfuscate the attributes in V sui . Figure 5 shows the interactions
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Figure 5: Aegis System Design and User Interaction Flow
among the user, Aegis, and the social network. As shown, step 0 represents the continuous Twitter stream analysis
performed by TP . As TP analyzes Twitter streams, it continuously updates the topic repository and the classification
sub-hierarchy.
The topic suggestion process SP mainly handles user interactions with Twitter. SP uses the topic classification
sub-hierarchy constructed and maintained by TP to suggest obfuscation topics. For every sensitive attribute s ∈ V sui ,
the user provides the indistinguishability parameter ks that determines how many attribute values from the domain of s
should be used to hide the true value of s. Aegis allows users to configure the privacy parameter ∆s for every attribute
s. However, to enhance usability, Aegis maintains a default value for the privacy parameter ∆s = 10%. This means
that the privacy of attribute s is achieved if the inference attack cannot distinguish the maximum inferred attribute value
from the kths inferred attribute value by more than 10%.
SP uses ks, and ∆s for every attribute s ∈ V sui to generate the topic suggestion set Si. Note that SP is locally deployed
at the user’s machine. Therefore, the user does not have to trust any service outside of her machine. Aegis is designed
to transfer user trust from the social network providers to the local machine. For every sensitive attribute s, SP selects
a fix set of ks − 1 attribute domain values. These ks − 1 attribute values are used to obfuscate the true value of attribute
s, Vui [s].
As shown in Figure 5, in Step 1, the user writes a post to publish on Twitter. SP receives this post and queries TP
about the attributes of all the topics mentioned in this post. SP uses these topic attributes to simulate the adversarial
attack. If TP ’s topic inference indicates that k-attribute-indistinguishability is violated for any attribute s ∈ V sui , SP
queries TP for topics with public persona V pui but linked to the other attribute values of s in the set of ks − 1 attribute
values. For every returned topic, SP ensures that writing about this topic enhances the aggregated inference of the
original post and the obfuscation posts towards ks-attribute-indistinguishability. SP adds these topics to the set Si and
returns them to the user (Step 2). The user selects a few topics from Si to post in Step 3 and submits the posts to SP .
Note that users are required to write the obfuscation posts using their personal writing styles to ensure that the original
posts and the obfuscation posts are indistinguishable [16, 30]. Afterwards, SP ensures that the aggregated inference of
submitted obfuscation posts in addition to the original post lead to k-attribute-indistinguishability. Otherwise, SP keeps
suggesting more topics. As every original post along with its obfuscation posts achieve k-attribute-indistinguishability,
the aggregated inference over the whole user’s posts achieve k-attribute-indistinguishability. In Step 4, SP queues the
original and the obfuscation posts and publishes them on the user’s behalf in random order and intervals to prevent
timing attacks (Step 5). An adversary can perform a timing attack if the original posts and the obfuscation posts are
distinguishable. Queuing and randomly publishing the posts prevents the adversary from distinguishing original posts
from the obfuscation posts and hence prevents timing attacks.
We understand that the obfuscation writing overhead might alienate users from Aegis. As a future extension, Aegis
can exploit deep neural network language models to learn the user’s writing style [21]. Aegis can use such a model
to generate [31] full posts instead of hashtags and users can either directly publish these posts or edit them before
publishing.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of Aegis in achieving multifaceted privacy. We first present
the experimental setup and analyze some properties of the used dataset in Section 5.1. Then, Sections 5.2 and 5.3
present illustrative inference and obfuscation examples that show the functionality of Aegis using real Twitter topics.
We experimentally show how Aegis can be used to hide user location in Section 5.4 and measure the effect of changing
the indistinguishability parameter k on the obfuscation overhead in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 illustrates the
efficiency of Aegis on hiding the user gender while preserving other persona attributes.
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5.1 Experimental Setup
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Figure 6: Examples of negligible, weak, and strong connection distribution topics for top-20 personas
Although Aegis can be integrated with different social network platform, our prototype implementation is integrated
only with the Twitter social network. Twitter provides developers with several public APIs [8] including the streaming
API that allows developers to crawl 1% of all the postings on Twitter. For our experiments, we use the 1% random
sampling of the Twitter stream during the year 2017. The attributes gender, ethnicity, and location are used to build a
three level topic classification hierarchy that classifies all topics according to their attribute distribution. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we use the language models in [41] to infer both gender and ethnicity attributes of a post
writer. In addition, we infer the location distribution of different topics using the explicitly geo-tagged posts about these
topics. In the 1% of Twitter’s 2017 postings, our models were able to extract 2,126,791 unique topics. Our classification
hierarchy suggests that 66% of the dataset tweets are posted by males. This analysis is consistent with the statistics
published in [7]. In addition, the dataset has 6,864,300 geo-tagged posts, 15% of which originated in California. Finally,
the predominant ethnicity extracted from the dataset is White.
As the classification hierarchy is built using only gender, ethnicity, and state location attributes, this results in a hierarchy
of 500 different paths from the root to a leaf of the hierarchy. These 500 paths result from all the possible combinations
of gender (male, female), ethnicity (White, Black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American), and state location (50 States).
The 500 paths represent the different 500 personas considered in our experiments. Our topic classification hierarchy
suggests that topics vary significantly in their connection to a specific persona path (a gender, ethnicity, and location
combination). For example, #GiveAway is widely discussed among the 500 personas across the 50 States with very
little skew towards specific personas over others. For topics that are widely discussed across all different persona, their
skew is usually proportional to the population density of different States. For example, the top five highly populated
states (CA, TX, FL, NY, and PA) usually appear as the top locations where widely discussed topics are posted. On
the other hand, other topics show strong connection to specific personas. For example, 33.93% of the personas who
write about #Disney are Male, Asian, and live in Florida where Disney World is located. Figure 6 shows 3 examples of
topics that have trivial, weak, and strong connection to specific personas. In Figure 6, the x-axis represents the top-20
personas who post about a topic and the y-axis represents the percentage of postings for each persona. As shown in
Figure 6a, #GiveAway has slight skew (negligible connection) towards some personas over other personas. Also, the
top most persona who post about #GiveAway represent only 3.94% of the overall postings about the topic. On the other
hand, Figure 6b shows that the persona distribution for #2a (refers to the second amendment) has more skew (weak
connection) towards some personas over others. As shown, the top posting persona on the topic #2a contributes 14.03%
of the overall postings of this topic. Finally, a topic like #Disney has remarkable skew (strong connection) towards
some personas over others. As shown in Figure 6c, the top posting persona on the topic #Disney contributes 33.93% of
the overall postings of this topic.
Strength Minimum δ Maximum δ
Negligible 0% 10%
Weak 10% 20%
Mild 20% 30%
Strong 30% 100%
Table 1: Topic to persona connection strength categories and their corresponding δ ranges
We define a topic to persona connection strength parameter δ. δ is defined as the difference in posting percentage
between the top-1 posting persona and the top-k posting persona. For #2a and k = 3, δ = 14.03− 3.45 = 10.6 while
for #Disney and for k=3, δ = 33.93− 6.19 = 27.74. We categorize topics into 4 categories according to their δ value.
As shown in Table 1, a topic to persona connection that ranges from 0% to 10% represents a negligible connection and
hence this topic does not reveal the persona attributes of the users who write about it. As the topic to persona connection
10
A PREPRINT - MAY 27, 2019
Topic Freq MW Ca F W Ca MW Tx F W Tx
#teen 7094 7 1 15 4
#hot 7478 5 1 13 3
#etsy 2739 6 5 27 1
#diy 1987 3 7 11 1
#actor 725 1 2 9 11
#cowboys 797 5 16 1 2
Table 2: Topic Analysis By Persona
increases, the potential of revealing the attributes of the users who write about this topic increases. In our experiments,
we measure the overhead of obfuscation for three different distributions with weak, mild and strong connections having
a topic to persona strength connection ranges that are shown in Table 1
5.2 Illustrative Inference Example
Using our tree data structure we can infer interesting information about different topics on Twitter in our dataset,
specifically regarding correlations between persona and topics. In Table 2 we analyze 7 topics and their connection to 4
of the most prominent personas in our dataset (Male-White-CA, Female-White-CA, Male-White-TX, Female-White-
TX). Frequency denotes the number of times the topic was observed and the number under a persona for a particular
topic denotes the order or rank in which a persona discusses this topic most. For example, among all the persona we
analyze in our dataset, #actor is most discussed by White Male Californians (rank 1) closely followed by White Female
also from California (rank 2). This is followed by other persona out of the focus of Table 2, until White Female Texans
are reached at rank 9 and White Male Texans at rank 11. Also, Table 2 shows that both #teen and #hot are discussed the
most by Female White Californians and that overall Females (in both CA and TX) who discuss this topic are more than
Males in both CA and TX. We can also observe correlations across topics that have semantic connections like #etsy and
#diy. Etsy is an online platform for users to sell DIY (Do It Yourself) projects. Female White Texans are much more
interested in such DIY specific topics than any other of the personas. Lastly, high correlations of certain topics can be
observed with specific locations such as #actor with California and #cowboys with Texas. As Table 2 reveals, the topics
you post on social media significantly reveal your attributes, even private sensitive attributes you are unwilling to share.
As such, we need a tool like Aegis to prevent adversaries from inferring private attributes while preserving others.
5.3 Illustrative Obfuscation Example
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Figure 7: Illustrative Gender Obfuscation Example.
In this section, we provide an illustrative obfuscation example that shows how Aegis achieves multifaceted privacy.
This example begins with a newly created Twitter profile of a Male, White user who lives in California. The user
wants to obfuscate his gender among the gender domain values {male, female} achieving 2-gender-indistinguishably.
Indistinguishability holds if the privacy parameter ∆g = 0.1 is achieved. ∆g is set to 0.1 (or 10%) to ensure that users
who write topics with only negligible topic to persona strength connection do not have to add any obfuscation posts to
their timelines as the topics they post do not reveal their sensitive attributes. In addition, the user wants to preserve
his ethnicity and location attributes as his public persona. Now, assume that the user tweets #gowarriors to show his
support for his favorite Californian basketball team, the Golden State Warriors.
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(b) Location (Mild)
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Figure 8: Effect of obfuscation posts on location and user persona given weak, mild and strong connected topics to
locations
Unfortunately, as shown in Figure 7, #gowarriors has a strong connection to the male gender attribute value. In
Figure 7, the x-axis represents the posted hashtags one after the other and the y-axis represents the aggregated
gender inferences for both male and female attribute values over all the posted hashtags. In addition, δ represents the
difference of the aggregated gender inference between male and female attribute values. As shown, initially, δ = 43%
which indicates a strong link between the user’s gender and the male attribute value. As δ ≥ ∆g, this indicates that
2-gender-indistinguishably is violated.
Therefore, Aegis suggests to post topics that are mainly discussed by White people who live in California but linked
to the female gender attribute value. Figure 7 shows the effect of posting subsequent topics on the aggregated gender
inference. The topic #womenintech helps to reduce the aggregate inference difference to 19%. #organicfood brings
the difference down to 11% and #bodybuilding reduces it to 7%. Notice that δ = 7% achieves δ ≤ ∆g and hence
2-gender-indistinguishably is achieved. Notice that the same example holds if the user’s true gender is female. The goal
of Aegis is not to invert the gender attribute value but to achieve inference indistinguishability among kg = 2 different
gender attribute values.
5.4 User Location Obfuscation
The number and the topic to persona connection strength of the obfuscation topics largely depend on the topic to
persona connection strength of the original posts. In this experiment, we show how Aegis is used to hide user location
while preserving their gender and ethnicity. In this experiment, we set kl = 3 where user location is hidden among
three locations. ∆l is set to 0.1 to indicate that 3-location-indistinguishability is achieved if the difference between
the highest (top-1) aggregated location inference and the 3rd (top-3) aggregated location inference is less than 10%.
The number of obfuscation posts needed and their effect on the user persona are reported. This experiment runs using
4707 weak topics, 1984 mild topics, and 1106 strong topics collected from Twitter over several weeks. This experiment
assumes a newly created twitter profile simulated with one of the personas in Table 2. First, a post with some topic to
location connection strength (weak, mild, or strong) is added to the user profile. Then, we add the suggested obfuscation
posts one at a time to the user’s timeline. After every added obfuscation post, the location and persona inference are
reported. The reported numbers are aggregated and averaged for every topic to location connection strength category.
Figure 8 shows the effect of adding obfuscation posts on both the location inference and the persona inference for
weak, mild, and strong topics. As shown in Figure 8a, the 4707 weak topics on average need just one obfuscation
suggestion to achieve 3-location-indistinguishability when ∆l = 0.1. Note that adding more obfuscation posts achieves
3-location-indistinguishability for smaller ∆ls (e.g., ∆l = 0.05 (4 suggestions), ∆l = 0.04 (5 suggestions)). Also,
adding one suggestion post achieves 26.5% reduction in δ. The same experiment is repeated for mild and strong topics
and the results are reported in Figures 8b and 8c respectively. Notice that strong topics requires four suggestions on
average to achieve 3-location-indistinguishability when ∆ = 0.1. Also, in Figures 8c, adding a single suggestion post
achieves 49.8% reduction in δ.
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Figures 8d, 8e, and 8f show the effect on user persona after adding obfuscation posts to weak, mild, and strong posts
respectively. User persona is represented by gender and ethnicity. As obfuscation posts are carefully chosen to align
with the user persona, we observe negligible changes on the average gender and ethnicity inferences after adding
obfuscation posts.
5.5 The Effect of Changing kl
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Figure 9: Change in δ as obfuscation posts are added
In this experiment, we measure the effect of changing the parameter kl on the number of obfuscation posts required to
achieve k-location-indistinguishability. kl determines the number of locations within which user ui wants to hide her
true location. Increasing kl increases the achieved privacy and boosts the required obfuscation overhead to achieve
k-location-indistinguishability. Assume users in Texas hide their State level location among 3 States: Texas, Alabama,
and Arizona. A malicious advertiser who wants to target users in Texas is uncertain about their location and now has to
pay 3 times the cost of the original advertisement campaign to reach the same target audience. Therefore, increasing k
inflates the cost of micro-targeting.
This experiment uses 621 strong topics collected from Twitter over several weeks. The average δ = Vui [l]1 − Vui [l]kl
is reported for all topics. In addition, the effect of adding obfuscation posts on the average δ for different values of
kl = 3, 5, and 7 is reported. Figure 9 shows the effect of adding obfuscation posts on the aggregated location inference
for different values of kl. The privacy parameter ∆l is set to ∆l = 0.1.
As shown in Figure 9, achieving 3-location indistinguishability for strong topics requires 4 obfuscation posts on the
average for ∆l = 0.1. On the other hand, 7-location indistinguishability requires more than 5 obfuscation posts for the
same value of ∆l. This result highlights the trade-off between privacy and obfuscation overhead. Achieving higher
privacy levels by increasing kl or lowering ∆l requires more obfuscation posts and hence more overhead. Obfuscation
posts are carefully chosen to align with the user persona. Therefore, we observe negligible changes on the average
gender and ethnicity inferences after adding obfuscation posts for different values of kl.
5.6 User Gender Obfuscation
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
0 1 2 3 4 5
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 G
en
de
r I
nf
er
en
ce
 (%
)
Number of Suggested Topics
Male Female δ
57.91
34.63
16.35
8.41
4.52 2.34
Figure 10: The effect of obfuscation posts on gender inference for strong connected topics to gender.
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This experiment shows how Aegis is used to hide user gender while preserving their ethnicity and location. In this
experiment, we set kg = 2 where user gender should be hidden among male and female gender domain values. ∆g is
set to ∆g = 0.1 to indicate that 2-gender-indistinguishability is achieved if the difference between the highest (top-1)
aggregated gender inference and the 2nd (top-2) aggregated gender inference is less than 10%. This experiment runs
over 40 gender strongly connected topics. The aggregated gender inference is reported when adding the original strong
post to the user’s timeline and after adding every obfuscation post one at a time. In addition, δ, the difference between the
male gender inference and the female gender inference is reported. 2-gender-indistinguishability is achieved if δ ≤ 10%.
As shown in Figure 10, gender strongly connected topics result in high δ that violates the 2-gender-indistinguishability
privacy target. Therefore, Aegis suggest obfuscation posts that results in δ reduction. Figure 10 shows that strong topics
need on the average 3 obfuscation posts to achieve the gender privacy target. This result is quite consistent with the
location obfuscation experiments in Section 5.4. This shows Aegis’s obfuscation mechanism is quite generic and can
be efficiently used to hide different user sensitive attributes. Finally, as the obfuscation posts are carefully chosen to
align with the user’s public persona attributes, we observed negligible changes on the average location and ethnicity
inferences after adding obfuscation posts.
6 Related Work
The problem of sensitive attribute privacy of social network users has been extensively studied in the literature from
different angles. k-anonymity [40, 42, 43] and its successors l-diversity [35] and t-closeness [34] are well-known and
widely used privacy models in publishing dataset to hide user information among a set of indistinguishable users in
the dataset. Also, differential privacy [22–24] has been widely used in the context of dataset publishing to hide the
identity of a user in a published dataset. These models focus on hiding user identity among other users in the published
dataset. Another variation of differential privacy is pan-privacy [25]. Pan-privacy is designed to work for data streams
and hence it is more suitable for social network streams privacy. However, these models are service centric and assume
trusted service providers. In this paper, we tackle the privacy problem from the end-user angle where the user identity is
known and all their online social network postings are public and connected to their identity. Our goal is to confuse
content-based sensitive attribute inference attacks by hiding the user’s original public posts among other obfuscation
posts. Our multifaceted privacy achieves the privacy of user sensitive attributes without altering their public persona.
In the context of social networks privacy, earlier works focus on sensitive attribute inferences due to the structure of
social networks. In [47], Zhelava and Getoor attempt to infer the user’s sensitive attributes using public and private user
profiles. However, the authors do not provide a solution to prevent such inference attacks. Georgiou et al. [26, 27]
study the inference of sensitive attributes in the presence of community-aware trending topic reports. An attacker can
increase their inference confidence by consuming these reports and the corresponding community characteristics of the
involved users. In [27], a mechanism is proposed to prevent social network services from publishing trending topics
that reveal information about individual users. However, this mechanism is service centric and it is not suitable for
hiding a user’s sensitive attributes against content-based inference attacks. Ahmad et al. [15] introduce a client-centered
obfuscation solution for protecting user privacy in personalized web searches. The privacy of a search query is achieved
by hiding it among other obfuscation search queries. Although this work is client-centered, it is not suitable for social
networks privacy where the user online persona has to be preserved.
Recent works have focused on the privacy of some sensitive attributes such as location of social network users. Ghufran
et al. [28] show that social graph analysis can reveal user location from friends and followers locations. Although, it
is important to protect user sensitive attributes like location against this attack, Aegis focuses only on content-based
inference attacks. Yakout et al. [44] proposed a system called Privometer, which measures how much privacy leaks
from certain user actions (or from their friends’ actions) and creates a set of suggestions that could reduce the risk of a
sensitive attribute being successfully inferred. Similar to Privometer, [32] proposes sanitation techniques to the structure
of the social graph by introducing noise, and obfuscating edges in the social graphs to prevent sensitive information
inference. Andres et al. [17] propose geo-indistinguishability, a location privacy model that uses differential privacy
to hide a user’s exact location in a circle of radius r from locaction based service providers. In a recent work, Zhang
et al. [46] introduce Tagvisor, a system to protect users against content-based inference attacks. However, Tagvisor
requires users to alter their posts by changing or replacing hashtags that reveal their location. Other works [18, 29]
depend on user collaboration to hide an individual’s exact location among the location of the collaboration group. This
approach requires group members to collaborate and synchronously change their identities to confuse adversaries.
However, these techniques are prone to content-based inference attacks and collaboration between users might be hard
to achieve in the social network context. For location based services, Mokbel et al. [36] use location generalization and
k-anonymity to hide the exact location of a query. These works do not preserve the user online persona while achieving
location privacy. In addition, these works do not provide a generic mechanism to hide other sensitive attributes such as
user gender and ethnicity.
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This paper presents Aegis, the first persona friendly system that enables users to hide their sensitive attributes while
preserving their online persona. Aegis is a client-centric solution that can be used to hide any user specified sensitive
attribute. Aegis does not require users to alter their original posts or topics. Instead, Aegis hides the user’s original
posts among other obfuscation posts that are aligned with their persona but linked to other sensitive attribute values
achieving k-attribute-indistinguishability.
7 Future Extensions
Research in the social network privacy has focused on dataset publishing and obfuscating user information among other
users. Such focus is service centric and assumes that service providers are trusted. However, Aegis is user centric and
aims to give the users control over their own privacy. This control comes with a cost represented by the obfuscation
posts that need to be posted by users. The role of Aegis is to automate the topic suggestion process and to ensure that
k-attribute-indistinguishability holds against content-base inference attacks. There are several directions where these
obfuscation and privacy models can evolve.
Obfuscation Post Generation. Aegis suggests topics as keywords or hashtags and requires users to write the obfuscation
posts using their personal writing styles to ensure that the original posts and the obfuscation posts are indistinguishable.
However, the obfuscation writing overhead might alienate users from Aegis. Instead, Aegis can exploit deep neural
network language models to learn the user’s writing style. Aegis can use such a model to suggest full posts instead of
hashtags and users can either directly publish these posts or edit them before publishing. This extension aims to reduce
the overhead on the users by automating the obfuscation post generation.
Social Graph Attack Prevention. Aegis is mainly designed to obfuscate the user sensitive attributes against content-based
inference attacks. An orthogonal attack is to use the attribute values of friends and followers to infer a user’s real
sensitive attribute value. Take location as a sensitive attribute example. Ghufran et al., [28] show that user location can
be inferred from the locations of followers and friends. A user whose friends are mostly from NYC is highly probable
to be from NYC. Aegis can be extended to prevent this attack. Users of similar persona but different locations can
create an indistinguishability network where users in this network have followers and friends from different locations.
Similar to the obfuscation topics, Aegis could suggest users to follow with similar persona but different locations.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose multifaceted privacy, a novel privacy model that obfuscates a user’s sensitive attributes
while publicly revealing their public online persona. To achieve the multifaceted privacy, we build Aegis, a prototype
client-centric social network stream processing system that achieves multifaceted privacy. Aegis is user-centric and
allows social network users to control which persona attributes should be publicly revealed and which should be kept
private. Aegis is designed to transfer user trust from the social network providers to her local machine. For this, Aegis
continuously suggests topics and hashtags to social network users to post in order to obfuscate their sensitive attributes
and hence confuse content-based sensitive attribute inferences. The suggested topics are carefully chosen to preserve
the user’s publicly revealed persona attributes while hiding their private sensitive persona attributes. Our experiments
show that Aegis is able to achieve sensitive attributes privacy such as location and gender. Adding as few as 0 to 4
obfuscation posts (depending on how strongly connected the original post is to a persona) successfully hides the user
specified sensitive attributes without altering the user’s public persona attributes.
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